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Who am I? Autobiographical Retrieval Improves Access to Self-Concepts 
 
Abstract 
 
It is considered that an individual’s current self-concept plays a crucial role in guiding the 
retrieval of autobiographical memory. Using a novel fluency paradigm, the present research 
examined whether or not the reverse is also true, i.e. does memory retrieval influence the 
description of the conceptual self? Specifically, this study examined the effect of prior 
autobiographical reverie on the subsequent retrieval of stored self-concepts. Participants 
wrote a description of a personally relevant memory or a control topic (of no relevance to the 
self), following which they had 60 seconds to generate as many self-defining statements as 
possible, each beginning with I am. Participants engaging in autobiographical retrieval 
generated significantly more statements than those in the control condition, suggesting that 
autobiographical retrieval increased access to self-concepts. Type of statement also varied 
according to group. Participants in the autobiographical memory condition were more likely 
to conceptualise themselves in relation to their psychological traits, and this was replicated in 
a second experiment conducted online. Findings support the idea that self and episodic 
memory are highly related constructs, and are discussed in relation to implications for 
individuals with autobiographical memory deficits.   
 
 
Key words: self, autobiographical memory, identity, self-concept, episodic memory 
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Who am I? Autobiographical Retrieval Improves Access to Self-Concepts 
Although the idea that there is a relationship between self and memory is not new (e.g. 
Locke, 1694/1975), it has been somewhat difficult to test empirically. Research demonstrates 
that information is more powerfully encoded with reference to the self (e.g. Rogers, Kuiper & 
Kirker, 1977), and that the self operates as an organisational structure in autobiographical 
retrieval (e.g. Rathbone, Moulin & Conway, 2008). Similarly, functional neuroimaging 
studies demonstrate an overlap in activation between regions involved in self-related 
processing and autobiographical retrieval (Addis, 2005).  In cognition more generally, the 
self-concepts or primes related to the self have been shown to influence performance across a 
range of tasks. For instance, a female in a room filled with males is substantially more likely 
to reference gender in self-description tasks (McGuire & Padawer-Singer, 1976).  
The commonly held idea that our self is (at least in part) a cognitive structure that is 
stored or retrieved as part of a memory system has received less empirical support.  This is a 
critical issue, as it is argued that memory deterioration in (for example) Alzheimer’s disease 
leads to a degradation - or lack of access to - the self (e.g. Addis & Tippet, 2004).  That is, 
people with memory impairment are less able to generate statements about themselves.  The 
present work uses an experimental procedure to test this idea explicitly: does 
autobiographical retrieval increase access to self-concepts?  
The self is a multidimensional construct that has proved notoriously difficult to 
define, indeed, the term ‘self’ has been used to refer to a variety of constructs and processes 
(e.g. Leary & Tangney, 2012), but in this instance, self is considered from a cognitive 
viewpoint, as a body of knowledge. In particular, the focus of the present work is on self-
knowledge and the dynamic “self-images” that people use to describe the different aspects of 
their identity (Markus, 1977).  
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The most influential model to consider the self from a cognitive viewpoint is 
Conway’s Self Memory System (SMS; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000, Conway, 2005). 
This conceptual model highlights the interrelatedness of self-concepts and memory, and 
proposes a bidirectional relationship between the two. Within this model, Conway (2005) 
describes the ‘working self’, a dynamic entity that organises the encoding and retrieval of 
autobiographical memories in line with current goals and self-images. The working self is 
constrained by autobiographical memories that are, in turn, a product of episodic memories 
and the semantic contents of the long-term self.   The SMS predicts that, at any given time, 
the most salient aspects of the self are supported by a set of relevant autobiographical 
memories which are preferentially active (see Rathbone & Moulin, 2014) .In keeping with 
the bidirectional nature of this relationship, the present study explores whether the reverse is 
also true – does the retrieval of particular autobiographical memories influence which aspects 
of the self are most active? 
The Twenty Statements Task (TST; Kuhn & McPartland, 1954) is an approach to 
exploring aspects of self. It asks participants to describe their sense of self by responding 
open-endedly to the question ‘Who am I?’, and thus, it allows for exploration of what 
Conway describes as the ‘conceptual self’, that is, self-images that capture general factual 
and evaluative knowledge of one’s self ( e.g. “I am happy”, “I am a person who likes to have 
fun”; Conway, 2005). Crucially, research by Addis and Tippet (2004) demonstrated that 
measures of autobiographical memory in Alzheimer’s disease are correlated with the number 
of statements generated in this task, highlighting a possible association between the capacity 
to retrieve from autobiographical memory and the accessibility of the conceptual self.  To 
operationalize the TST as a measure of access to self-concepts, we developed the I Am 
Fluency Task (Experiment 1). In this task, participants are instructed to generate as many I 
am statements as they can in a given time.  
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The I Am Fluency Task also derives from previous research with the I Am Memory 
Task (Rathbone et al., 2008), which examines the self-memory relationship by collecting 
memories that are associated with self-images. In particular, these self-images are in the form 
of  I am statements, such as ‘I am ambitious’. This task has proven useful in demonstrating 
how the self plays an organizational role in memory (e.g. Rathbone et al., 2008), and how 
self-concept is intact in traumatic brain injury (Rathbone, Moulin & Conway, 2009), but 
diminished in autism (Tanweer, Rathbone & Souchay, 2010).  In order to examine the 
accessibility of self-concept statements, the original I Am Memory Task was modified such 
that participants are given one minute to generate as many statements as possible beginning 
with the phrase I am. The assumption being that the ability to generate statements in a given 
time reflects accessibility to self-concept. This task is simple, open-ended, quick to 
administer and able to access both narrative (e.g. I am married) and trait based (e.g. I am 
cheerful) knowledge of the self. By asking participants to retrospectively rate their 
statements, it also allows for examination of the organization, perceived importance and 
emotional valence of statements. In sum, we propose that this novel tool will allow for both 
quantitative and qualitative exploration of self, whilst preserving the subjective and 
idiosyncratic nature of this construct. A major pragmatic motivation for the present research 
is its potential usefulness in clinical settings and patient work. For instance, the I Am Fluency 
Task might be used in clinical work to establish aspects of identity that a person currently 
feels connected to, as well as those they may wish to develop. 
Our aims were based on a single core concept: if there is a relationship between self 
and memory, we should be able to use an experimental design to observe changes in the 
accessibility of self-concepts following a memory manipulation. Specifically, the present 
study examined self-concept retrieval in the I Am Fluency Task following memory retrieval 
by asking participants to retrieve a personally-relevant autobiographical memory (or perform 
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a control task) prior to the generation of self-concept statements. Unlike previous research in 
this area, the I Am Fluency Task allows for exploration of self-concepts in general, rather than 
having targeted any particular self-concept. Our prediction was straight forward: if dwelling 
on an autobiographical incident activates self-concepts, then we should be able to measure an 
increase in the accessibility of self-concept, relative to a control condition.  
EXPERIMENT 1 
In an attempt to ensure that participants recalled highly self-relevant and important 
autobiographical memories, Experiment 1 asked participants to recall a past life event that 
they thought about in a ‘nostalgic’ manner. Wilschut, Sedikides, Arndt and Routledge (2006), 
suggested that such “descriptions of nostalgic experiences typically featured the self as a 
protagonist …in momentous events” (p.975).  
As the working self is dynamic and context dependent, and because contemporary 
theory supports the idea of a bidirectional relationship between self and memory (e.g. 
Conway, 2005), we predicted that participants in the autobiographical memory condition 
would generate significantly more self-concept statements than those in the control condition.  
Since our task is open-ended we were also able to consider whether autobiographical retrieval 
influenced the particular aspects of self that were most accessible to participants, and we 
propose that examining the impact of autobiographical memory on different types of self-
concept will shed light on the way that these two constructs are represented and linked.   
Method 
Participants 
The 48 participants (4 males) aged 18-24 (M = 19.02, SD = 1.08) were Psychology 
students at the University of Leeds who received course credit for participation. In a between-
subjects design, participants were randomly allocated to one of two experimental conditions 
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(autobiographical  memory vs. control). Groups were matched on gender, age (t (46) = .66, p 
= .51) and years of education (t (46) = .25, p = .81). Informed consent was obtained from 
each participant and research was approved by the Institute of Psychological Sciences’ 
(University of Leeds) ethics committee. 
Materials and procedure 
Participants were tested in groups ranging in size from 1 to 6 participants. Participants 
were seated at separate desks. They were provided with a booklet for their responses and all 
instructions were read aloud by the experimenter. Tasks are described in the order in which 
they were completed by participants.  
Autobiographical memory manipulation 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the autobiographical memory or control 
condition. In the autobiographical memory condition participants were instructed to write a 
detailed description of a personal event from their past. The following instructions (adapted 
from Wildschut et al.,2006) were read aloud to participants; 
Please think of a past event in your life that has personal meaning to you. This should 
be an event that you think about in a nostalgic way. Nostalgia refers to a sentimental longing 
for the past, typically for a time or place with happy personal memories associated with it. 
Please try to think of an important part of your past that makes you feel most nostalgic. Write 
down this nostalgic experience in all its vivid detail, you should be as detailed, thorough, and 
descriptive as possible. 
In our control condition, participants wrote a description of the solar system - this was 
unlikely to cue self-relevant memories. Participants were instructed to write a detailed, 
factual description that contained no personally relevant information, specifically, the 
following instructions were read aloud to participants; 
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Please write a description of the solar system. This should be a factual description, 
and should not include descriptions that have any personal relevance to you. For instance, 
think of defining features or any facts that you know about the solar system for instance, the 
solar system consists of the sun, and Mercury is the planet that is closest to the sun. You 
should be as detailed, thorough, and descriptive as possible. Don’t worry if you are not sure 
whether some of the things that you write down are accurate, that doesn’t matter, just write 
as much as you can. 
In both conditions participants were given four minutes to write their description and 
an additional minute to generate four keywords relevant to their description.  
I Am Fluency Task 
To measure self-concept the I Am Fluency Task was administered. Participants were 
asked to produce stable and enduring aspects of their identity, in the form of statements that 
they felt were essential to defining who they were. To avoid cuing statements, no specific 
examples were given, but participants were told that they might include roles, personality 
traits or physical traits. Participants were told that each statement must begin with the phrase 
I am, and were given one minute to write down as many of these statements as possible. 
Subjective experience scales 
Questions were administered to assess participants’ mood, emotionality, feelings of 
nostalgia and how much they thought about themselves whilst writing their description. The 
question that assessed feelings of nostalgia also allowed a manipulation check to ensure that 
participants engaged with the description writing task. 
Self-statement ratings 
After the fluency part of the task, participants returned to their self-statements and 
were asked to rate each of their self-concept statements on two dimensions. Firstly, they rated 
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how important and central each I am statement was to defining their identity, using a scale of 
1 to 10, with 10 being very important and 1 being not important at all. Secondly, participants 
rated each statement on emotional valence i.e. how positive or negative they felt about each I 
am statement, again on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being extremely positive and 1 being 
extremely negative. Finally, participants were asked to retrospectively date each of their I am 
statements, whereby they gave an age at which they became a person who would define 
themselves using that statement. Participants assigned ‘0’ to statements that had been self-
defining for as long as they could remember. 
Fluency checks 
As the task of primary interest involved generating statements under time pressure, a 
series of fluency tasks were included to examine group differences. Category fluency was 
assessed by asking participants to write as many animals as they could in one minute. Letter 
fluency was assessed using the FAS Controlled Oral Word Association Test (Benton, 1968) 
that asked participants to generate as many words as they could beginning with the letters ‘F’, 
‘A’ and ‘S’. Participants were given one minute for each letter, with a fluency score derived 
by averaging the number of words generated for each letter.  
Data coding  
Data was coded by three independent judges; the experimenter and two postgraduate 
students at the University of Leeds who were blind to the hypotheses. Data was coded 
according to three categories; physical, social and psychological. Self-statements were coded 
as physical if they reflected attributes that were apparent from appearance (e.g. small, 
brunette, 20, female, overweight, black, curly haired, pale), social if they described a social 
category that was objectively verifiable (e.g. student, hockey player, Irish, musician, friend, 
single, athlete, from Leeds, planning to be a psychologist) and psychological if they referred 
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to a personality trait that required the participant to be introspective and were also subjective 
in nature (e.g. helpful, patient, self-conscious, perfectionist, good friend, a bit weird, lucky, 
loyal).Whilst some self-concept statements were easy to assign to a particular category e.g. 
small and student, some were more difficult e.g. good friend. In such instances where an 
evaluative statement was used, statements were coded as psychological. If a statement was 
repeated during the task e.g. if a participant generated the word female twice, this was scored 
as one correct response. Post-coding comparisons revealed 100% agreement between judges. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Number of statements 
A total of 415 I am statements were collected across conditions, with 225 generated 
by participants in the autobiographical memory condition and 190 generated in the control 
condition. On average, participants in the autobiographical memory condition generated 9.38 
(SD = 2.02) I am statements in one minute, and participants in the control condition 
generated an average of 7.92 (SD = 1.91) statements in one minute. Univariate ANOVA 
revealed a significant effect of manipulation, f (1, 46) = 6.62, p = .01, ŋp² =.13, with 
participants in the autobiographical memory condition generating significantly more I am 
statements than those in the control condition. The self-statement ratings that participants 
assigned to each I am statement were also considered, but between groups analyses revealed 
no group differences (p>.23 in each case). 
Due to the nature of our task it was necessary to consider group differences on 
alternative fluency measures. Independent samples t-test revealed no group differences in 
category fluency (t (46) = 0.04, p =.97, d = 0.01), yet there was a marginal non-significant 
group difference in letter fluency, with participants in the autobiographical memory condition 
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being somewhat faster than those in the control condition, t (46) = 1.78, p =.08, d = 0.51. To 
investigate the idea that autobiographical retrieval had an overall effect on fluency, 
performance of participants in this condition on the letter fluency task was correlated with 
that on the I Am Fluency Task. Analysis revealed no correlation between the performance on 
these two tasks (r = .195, p = .36).
1
 
A manipulation check confirmed that our autobiographical memory induction was 
successful. Participants in this condition rated themselves as feeling significantly more 
nostalgic after writing their description than those in the control condition , t (46) = 8.61 , p 
<.001, d = 2.48. Participants in the autobiographical memory condition also rated their mood 
as being more positive following the descriptive writing task, t (48) = 3.75, p <.001, d = 1.09. 
This observation of elevated mood reflects the direct instruction given to participants in the 
AM condition that they retrieve a happy personal memory, and may suggest that retrieval was 
truly episodic and re-experienced. 
Next, findings were analysed in terms of the types of I am statements that were 
generated by participants in each condition.  
Type of statement 
First of all, the mean proportion of physical, social and psychological statements were 
calculated (see Figure 1).  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
                                                   
1
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Next, the type of statement generated by participants in each condition was examined 
using a 2 x 3 (condition x statement type) mixed design ANOVA, allowing for the incidence 
of an interaction between condition and statement type to be explored. There was no main 
effect of group (F (1, 46) = .73, p = .40), given that proportional data was used and thus the 
three statement types summed to 1.0 across groups, but there was a main effect of statement 
type (F (1.46, 67.09) = 73.67, p <.001), with participants generating a higher proportion of 
psychological statements, relative to social and physical statements. Furthermore, we also 
observed a significant statement type x group interaction (F (1.49, 67.09) = 6.56, p = .006), 
with significantly higher proportional rates of psychological statements produced in the 
autobiographical memory condition, relative to the control condition (t (38.38) = 2.92, p = 
.006, d = 0.86). In sum, we found that participants in the autobiographical memory condition 
were able to generate significantly more I am statements than those in the control condition; 
confirming the idea that autobiographical retrieval increased accessibility of self-concepts. 
This was independent of any variation between groups in general fluency ability. Mood 
ratings also confirmed that our autobiographical memory condition induces positive mood. 
Furthermore, the type of statement generated varied between conditions - following retrieval 
of a self-relevant memory participants were more likely to generate psychological, trait-like 
descriptions.  
EXPERIMENT 2 
While Experiment 1 made predictions about autobiographical memory increasing 
access to self-concepts in general, as evident in increased I Am fluency, Experiment 2 was 
designed to explore the particular type of self-statement generated in response to 
autobiographical retrieval. In particular, we were motivated to see whether the finding that 
autobiographical retrieval increases access to psychological self-concepts would be 
replicated. To this end, we developed an online questionnaire that allowed us to test the effect 
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in a larger and more diverse sample. Participants carried out broadly the same (between-
subjects) tasks, although the fluency component was removed. Specifically, all participants 
were asked to generate 10 self-images, and due to Internet format, no time limit was imposed. 
Method 
Participants  
87 participants (26 males and 60 females; 1 participant did not disclose this) were 
recruited via psychology questionnaire websites. Participants were aged 18-64 (M = 29.98, 
SD = 10.64) and groups were matched on age (t (85) = 1.36, p = .18, d = 0.29).  
Materials and Procedure 
Participants completed an online questionnaire that was similar to that used in 
Experiment 1. The fluency component of our procedure was removed, as type of statement 
generated was of primary interest here, but all other elements remained identical.  Each 
participant was asked to generate 10 I am statements. No time limit was given for this task, 
but participants were instructed to respond with the first statements that came to mind and to 
avoid editing their statements.  
Results and Discussion 
A total of 865 I am statements were collected in Experiment 2; all but two of the 
participants were able to generate 10 statements (both of these participants were in the 
control condition - one generated 6 I am statements, and the other generated 9 statements). 
Figure 2 shows the proportion of each type of statement generated and demonstrates 
replication of our previous finding; retrieving a highly self-relevant autobiographical memory 
increases access to psychological self-concept statements. 
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[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
Type of statement generated by participants in each condition was measured using a 2 
x 3 (condition x statement type) mixed design ANOVA, with condition as a between subjects 
variable and statement type as a within subjects variable. Findings replicated those in 
Experiment 1 and revealed no main effect of group (F (1, 85) = .000, p = 1.00), a main effect 
of statement type (F (1.29, 109.45) = 319.44, p <.001) and a significant statement type x 
group interaction (F (1.29, 109.45) = 5.69, p = .012).  In sum, whilst both groups generated a 
higher proportion of psychological statements, significantly higher proportional rates of 
psychological statements were produced in the autobiographical memory condition, relative 
to the control condition (t (76.13) = 2.93, p = .005, d = 0.61).Data was coded by a second 
independent judge who was blind to our hypotheses; Pearson’s correlation reveled high inter-
rater reliability between the two judges (Physical: r=.80; Psychological: r=.98; Social: r=.99). 
As in Experiment 1, between groups analysis revealed no group differences in self-statement 
ratings assigned by participants to each I am statement (p>.20 in each case). 
Findings from Experiment 2 provide support for those from Experiment 1 regarding 
the impact of retrieval of a self-relevant memory on type of I am statement generated. 
Importantly, this replication used a different version of our original I Am Fluency Task with a 
larger sample that was also considerably more diverse in terms of age, occupation type and 
gender, which was crucial given that Experiment 1 included only 4 males out of a total of 48 
participants. 
General Discussion 
How do we answer the question who am I?  We propose that one way this is achieved 
is through the retrieval of stored self-concepts. This study examined whether the accessibility 
of such self-concepts was influenced by the retrieval of personal experiences from memory, 
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as is predicted in Conway’s Self Memory System (e.g. Conway, 2005).  As such, it provided 
an experimental evaluation of the idea that self and memory are inextricably linked.  
We developed the I Am Fluency Task to examine the effect of autobiographical 
reverie on the retrieval of stored self-concepts. In Experiment 1, participants wrote a 
description of an autobiographical memory or a control topic of no relevance to the self and 
then generated as many self-defining statements as possible in one minute, each beginning 
with I am. Participants who retrieved a personally relevant memory were able to generate 
significantly more statements than those in the control condition; suggesting that 
autobiographical retrieval increases access to self-concepts. The type of statement generated 
also varied following retrieval of a self-relevant memory. For both experiments, and in both 
groups, the majority of statements generated were psychological in nature, but between-group 
comparisons revealed that participants in the autobiographical memory condition generated 
proportionately more psychological, trait-like descriptions. 
What implications might these findings have for the SMS? Our results show that the 
self is a dynamic construct insofar as there is a response to having generated an 
autobiographical memory on the accessibility of self-concepts. Indeed Conway (2005) 
describes the working self as changing constantly according to the constraints of 
autobiographical memory. Conway also suggests that one of the fundamental control 
processes of the working self is to ensure that memory is coherent with self-images; this 
directional link is illustrated well by studies that have examined the self-reference effect 
(Rogers et al., 1977) and demonstrated that the self functions to boost memory. In this case, 
we have shown that the reverse is also true; participants can retrieve more information about 
themselves following retrieval of an autobiographical memory. Thus it seems possible to use 
memory to ‘boost’ the self. What is unclear from our data is whether there was an overlap 
between self-statements and memories, that is, whether the content of the self-statements 
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reflected the content of the autobiographical memories that were recalled. It would certainly 
be valuable for future research to tease apart the distinction between autobiographical recall 
increasing the accessibility of relevant self-concepts, or self-concept more generally. 
There is considerable debate over whether conceptual self-knowledge is dependent on 
autobiographical memory. Within the context of the SMS, Conway (2005, p. 597) claims that 
the conceptual self is “connected to autobiographical knowledge and the episodic memory 
system to activate specific instances that exemplify, contextualize, and ground their 
underlying themes or concepts.” (as cited in Prebble, Addis & Tippett, 2012). Consistent with 
this, Addis and Tippett (2004) found that individuals with Alzheimer’s disease who presented 
with diminished autobiographical memory were less able to generate statements about 
themselves, and these two abilities were correlated. There is however, a growing body of 
literature that suggests that the self-concept can be known in the absence of episodic memory. 
For instance, Klein and colleagues (Klein, 2010; Klein & Gangi, 2010; Klein & Lax, 2010) 
have provided considerable evidence that episodic memories are not necessary in order for 
related trait self-knowledge to be accessed. Similarly, Rathbone, Moulin and Conway (2009) 
provide further support in their consideration of self in a case of retrograde amnesia; the 
authors demonstrate how conceptual autobiographical knowledge is used to support the self 
in the absence of episodic memory. Perhaps the most convincing evidence comes from work 
with patient K.C. who was able to accurately update his conceptual self-knowledge in spite of 
severe episodic memory impairment (Tulving, 1993). To our knowledge, the present study is 
the first of its type to demonstrate that autobiographical memory can be used to access the 
self, and thus identity can be supported by autobiographical memory.  In fact most of the 
autobiographical memories retrieved by participants were episodic in nature. For instance, 
one participant wrote: 
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“I was sitting with three friends on the edge of a cliff which went down to a beach 
and the sea. It was really hot, about 30 degrees centigrade, the sky was completely blue and 
it was really peaceful. We had a picnic with bread, dips, crisps, those sorts of things. We had 
music playing on shuffle. We were all lying on towels, just really relaxed. There was a 
panoramic view around us, we could see all the sailing boats and some people swimming in 
the sea”. 
In response, we propose that whilst episodic memory might not be essential to the 
retrieval of self-knowledge, these two constructs are not entirely independent. We suggest 
that our findings, together with those of previous work (e.g. Klein & Loftus, 1990, 1993b; 
Rathbone et al., 2009), can be interpreted in relation to the Self-Knowledge and Identity 
Model (SKIM Model; Haslam, Jetten, Haslam, Pugliese & Tonks, 2011), which proposes that 
“semantic self-knowledge mediates a bidirectional relationship between episodic self-
knowledge and identity” (Haslam et al., 2011, p. 184). It may be the case, that as has been 
shown with knowledge, self-concepts undergo a process of semanticisation, encoded initially 
as a response to a particular event or occurrence, but that over time, the trait, quality or 
disposition becomes a more enduring and context-free aspect of personality. To test this, we 
would need to examine the acquisition of new aspects of the self over presumably quite long 
time scales. 
There is a general view that our memories of experience constrain what the self can 
be because it is tethered in reality, but likewise, our findings illustrate that what we can 
retrieve about our past probably also influences how we describe and think about our self. In 
this instance, autobiographical retrieval led participants to think more introspectively about 
their conceptual self and increased access to psychological trait-like descriptions in 
particular. Given the young age of our participants, it is possible that the memories they 
generated were particularly salient and personally significant and that this subsequently 
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exaggerated our effect. Indeed, very recent salient memories are likely to affect the selves 
generated more than a distant, less meaningful memory, and this is consistent with literature 
on the reminiscence bump, which suggests that autobiographical memories from early 
adulthood years are particularly vivid and also contribute to the shaping of a stable identity 
(e.g. Holmes & Conway, 1999). Future work could explore this issue by comparing the 
generation of self-statements across the lifespan.!
 For decades empirical progress in this area has been encumbered by the 
conceptualisation of self as a unitary construct (see Prebble, Addis & Tippett, 2012). Our 
findings support the more recent conceptualisation of the self-concept as a multifaceted 
knowledge structure (e.g. Klein & Gangi, 2010), with different elements being more salient 
and accessible at different times and in different contexts. We suggest that even within the 
conceptual self, 'selfhood' can be fractionated, and it may be fruitful for future work to 
determine what happens when other aspects of the self (e.g. physical) are primed. 
Since retrieval of a memory seems to offer an immediate benefit in terms of access to 
self-concept, a chronic inability to think about oneself in the past may limit the number of 
self-concepts generated, and this is in line with the findings of Addis and Tippett (2004). In 
particular, this effect may be greatest for psychological self-concept. Thus we suggest that 
our paradigm might be useful with groups that have deficits in memory and/or the self. For 
instance, in dementia, acquired brain injury and post-traumatic stress disorder, it can provide 
a way of exploring these deficits broadly and in regard to particular types of self-concept. 
Indeed such research is crucial in relation to claims that an intact self-concept is necessary for 
maintaining normal psychological functioning and a coherent sense of self over time 
(Conway, 2004). The open-ended nature of our task, together with the idiosyncratic nature of 
the self, also promotes its use by clinicians in the delivery of person-centred therapy and the 
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development of individualised approaches to rehabilitation. We propose that this work can 
provide a platform for subsequent research in a range of clinical settings and populations. 
Conclusion 
In sum, our results promote the effectiveness of the I Am Fluency Task for exploring 
self-concept. Our data confirms Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) conceptualisation of 
the working self as dynamic and fluid, demonstrates that self-concept and episodic 
autobiographical knowledge are interactive, and supports the idea that the self is 
reconstructive in relation to memories - we provide evidence that it is possible to use memory 
in order to increase the accessibility of self-concepts.  Of particular interest is the finding that 
autobiographical retrieval is most closely associated with psychological selves, which has 
important implications for people with autobiographical memory deficits. We believe that the 
I Am Fluency Task can be used as a measure to quickly gauge access to self-concepts.  Rather 
than being encumbered by definitions of what the self is, and what it might be for, our task 
places an emphasis on the quantitative and qualitative analysis of self-concepts that are 
generated by the person themselves.  
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Footnote 
To check that verbal fluency did not underlie the difference in I Am statement generation that 
was observed between conditions, we ran an analysis of covariance, adding in letter fluency 
score as a covariate.  The significant effect of group was unchanged. 
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Figure 1. Mean proportion of physical, social and psychological statements generated by 
participants in each experimental condition. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
 
  
RUNNING HEAD: WHO AM I?  
26 
 
Figure 2. Mean proportion of physical, social and psychological statements generated by 
participants in each experimental condition. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
